Inductive Logic - Revision history

Hannibal: /* The Actual 'Problem of Induction'! */

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 18:27:10 GMT

The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!

←Older revision		Revision as of 18:27, 14 April 2010
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-	But this in itself is not the whole story, in fact, if we stop here, ''we get the story all wrong''. You see, the ''uniformity of nature'' is in fact a necessary condition for induction but it could never be a sufficient justification of inductive inference anyway.	+	So, as a general rule, if you hear someone claim that the UON is used by 'logicians' to 'justify induction', you can be fairly certain that you're dealing with someone ignorant of the very basics of what logic is... As you can now see, the ''uniformity of nature'' is in fact a necessary condition for induction but it could never be a sufficient justification of inductive inference. The fact that the assumption of a uniformity of nature (UON) is of no help in justifying induction is not a concern to logicians in the first place, seeing as the ''actual problem of induction'' has ''nothing to do with the assumption of a uniformity of nature'' in the first place! The actual problem of induction is the claim that there is no valid logical ''connection'' between a collection of past experiences and what will be the case in the future. The classic ''white swans'' example serves: the fact that every swan you've seen in the past was white means simply that: every swan you've seen has been white. There is no logical "therefore" to bridge the connection "''all the swans I've seen are white''" to '' all swans are white'' or "''the next swan I encounter will be white''".
-		+
-	So, as a general rule, if you hear someone claim that the UON is used by 'logicians' to 'justify induction', you can be fairly certain that you're dealing with someone ignorant of the very basics of what logic is...	+
-		+
-	So, the fact that the assumption of a uniformity of nature (UON) is of no help in justifying induction is not a concern to logicians in the first place, seeing as the ''actual problem of induction'' has ''nothing to do with the assumption of a uniformity of nature'' in the first place! The actual problem of induction is the claim that there is no valid logical ''connection'' between a collection of past experiences and what will be the case in the future. The classic ''white swans'' example serves: the fact that every swan you've seen in the past was white means simply that: every swan you've seen has been white. There is no logical "therefore" to bridge the connection "''all the swans I've seen are white''" to '' all swans are white'' or "''the next swan I encounter will be white''".	+

	So, yes induction presupposes the uniformity of nature, but while this is a necessary condition for induction, the UN is not sufficient condition for justifying induction, nor is it considered to be a sufficient condition by modern logicians. So, any attempt to solve the problem by shoring up the 'uniformity of nature' will never work. When the next swan turns out to be black, it shows your statement "all swans are white" had no actual "knowledge" content. What you've done is presupposed nature to be uniform, but not in fact justified any particular inductive inference you may wish to make.		So, yes induction presupposes the uniformity of nature, but while this is a necessary condition for induction, the UN is not sufficient condition for justifying induction, nor is it considered to be a sufficient condition by modern logicians. So, any attempt to solve the problem by shoring up the 'uniformity of nature' will never work. When the next swan turns out to be black, it shows your statement "all swans are white" had no actual "knowledge" content. What you've done is presupposed nature to be uniform, but not in fact justified any particular inductive inference you may wish to make.

Hannibal: /* UON- A Non Solution to the Problem */

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 18:25:35 GMT

UON- A Non Solution to the Problem

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	Well then, if even logicians agree that the UON cannot justify induction, it would seem that the situation is hopeless. And it would be, if the claim that the UON cannot justify induction itself wasn't a [[http://editthis.info/logic/Informal_Fallacies#Red_Herring\|red red herring]].		Well then, if even logicians agree that the UON cannot justify induction, it would seem that the situation is hopeless. And it would be, if the claim that the UON cannot justify induction itself wasn't a [[http://editthis.info/logic/Informal_Fallacies#Red_Herring\|red red herring]].

-	The assumption of an UON does not address that actual problem of induction, because the actual problem relates to justifying moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules grounded in ~~deduction~~.	+	The assumption of an UON does not address that actual problem of induction, because the actual problem relates to justifying moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules grounded in deductive logic.

	==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==		==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==

Hannibal: /* UON- A Non Solution to the Problem */

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 18:25:09 GMT

UON- A Non Solution to the Problem

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	As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work.		As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work.

-	~~It might~~ seem that the situation is hopeless. ~~But there's a very interesting response to this situation:~~ the claim that the UON cannot justify induction is a [[http://editthis.info/logic/Informal_Fallacies#Red_Herring\|red herring]].	+	Well then, if even logicians agree that the UON cannot justify induction, it would seem that the situation is hopeless. And it would be, if the claim that the UON cannot justify induction itself wasn't a [[http://editthis.info/logic/Informal_Fallacies#Red_Herring\|red red herring]].

-	The assumption of an UON does ~~notv~~ address that actual problem of induction, ~~which~~ relates to ~~the problems with~~ moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules	+	The assumption of an UON does not address that actual problem of induction, because the actual problem relates to justifying moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules grounded in deduction.

	==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==		==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==

Hannibal: /* UON- A Non Solution to the Problem */

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 18:16:42 GMT

UON- A Non Solution to the Problem

←Older revision		Revision as of 18:16, 14 April 2010
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	As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work.		As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work.

-	But there's a very interesting response to this situation: the claim that the UON cannot justify induction ~~is itself problematic, because it~~ is a [[red herring~~\|informal~~]].	+	It might seem that the situation is hopeless. But there's a very interesting response to this situation: the claim that the UON cannot justify induction is a [[http://editthis.info/logic/Informal_Fallacies#Red_Herring\|red herring]].

-	~~Finally, the~~ assumption does ~~not even~~ address that actual problem of induction, which relates to the problems with moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules	+	The assumption of an UON does notv address that actual problem of induction, which relates to the problems with moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules

	==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==		==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==
-

Hannibal: /* UON- A Non Solution to the Problem */

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 18:09:54 GMT

UON- A Non Solution to the Problem

←Older revision		Revision as of 18:09, 14 April 2010
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	As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work.		As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work.

-	But there's a very interesting	+	But there's a very interesting response to this situation: the claim that the UON cannot justify induction is itself problematic, because it is a [[red herring\|informal]].
-		+
-	~~Finally,~~ the ~~assumption does not even address~~ that ~~actual problem of induction, which relates to the problems with moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted~~ the UON ~~as true, this assumption would not, in of~~ itself, ~~provide~~ a ~~framework for moving from observations to a general rule~~. ~~To do this, we need a set of rules~~	+

		+	Finally, the assumption does not even address that actual problem of induction, which relates to the problems with moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules

	==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==		==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==

Hannibal: /* Types of Inductive Logic */

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 18:08:11 GMT

Types of Inductive Logic

←Older revision		Revision as of 18:08, 14 April 2010
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	Let's do a brief review of some kinds of Inductive Logic		Let's do a brief review of some kinds of Inductive Logic
		+
		+	===Argument from analogy===
		+
		+	This occurs when we compare two phenomena based on traits that they share. For example, we might hold that Object 'A' shares the traits w, x and y, with with object 'B,' therefore, object A might also share other qualities of object B.
		+
		+	===Statistical syllogism===
		+
		+	This inductive logic is similar to the argument from analogy. The form of the logic follows: X% of "A" are "B", so the probability of "A' being "B" is X%
		+
		+	Example: 3% of smokers eventually contract lung cancer. John Doe is a smoker, therefore, he has a 3% chance of contracting lung cancer.
		+
		+	===Generalization from sample to population===
		+
		+	The best example of this inductive logic would be a poll. Polls rely on random samples that are representative of a group by virtue of their random selection (i.e. the fact that every person had the same chance of being chosen for the sample).
		+
		+	For those further interested in induction,see my page on the scientific method: http://www.candleinthedark.com/scientific.html In addition, at the bottom of this section, I will also discuss John Stuart Mill's Method of Causality. The rest of this page will focus on the aformentioned "problem of induction" and take a deeper look both at the problem of induction, and some solutions for this problem.
		+
		+

	===Simple induction===		===Simple induction===
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	: Therefore:		: Therefore:
	: There is a probability corresponding to Q that other members of group G will have attribute A when next observed.		: There is a probability corresponding to Q that other members of group G will have attribute A when next observed.
-
-	~~===Argument from analogy===~~
-
-	This occurs when we compare two phenomena based on traits that they share. For example, we might hold that Object 'A' shares the traits w, x and y, with with object 'B,' therefore, object A might also share other qualities of object B.
-
-	~~===Statistical syllogism===~~
-
-	~~This inductive logic is similar to the argument from analogy. The form of the logic follows: X% of "A" are "B", so the probability of "A' being "B" is X%~~
-
-	~~Example: 3% of smokers eventually contract lung cancer. John Doe is a smoker, therefore, he has a 3% chance of contracting lung cancer.~~
-
-	~~===Generalization from sample to population===~~
-
-	The best example of this inductive logic would be a poll. Polls rely on random samples that are representative of a group by virtue of their random selection (i.e. the fact that every person had the same chance of being chosen for the sample).
-
-	For those further interested in induction,see my page on the scientific method: http://www.candleinthedark.com/scientific.html In addition, at the bottom of this section, I will also discuss John Stuart Mill's Method of Causality. The rest of this page will focus on the aformentioned "problem of induction" and take a deeper look both at the problem of induction, and some solutions for this problem.

	==The Problem of Induction==		==The Problem of Induction==

Hannibal at 17:55, 14 April 2010

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 17:55:24 GMT

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	So, it turns out that this defense is circular... we assume what we seek to justify in the first place, that the past will be like the future. So this argument fails to provide a justification for induction.		So, it turns out that this defense is circular... we assume what we seek to justify in the first place, that the past will be like the future. So this argument fails to provide a justification for induction.

-	But this in itself is not the whole story, in fact, if we stop here, ''we get the story all wrong''. You see, the ''uniformity of nature'' is in fact a necessary condition for induction but it could never be a sufficient justification of inductive inference anyway.

		+	===UON- A Non Solution to the Problem===
		+
		+	As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work.

-	~~===A Non Solution to the Problem===~~	+	But there's a very interesting

-	~~Can we assume~~ that ~~nature has~~ a ~~Uniformity?~~	+	Finally, the assumption does not even address that actual problem of induction, which relates to the problems with moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules

-	As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work.

-	~~Finally, the assumption does not even address that actual problem~~ of induction, which relates to the problems with moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules	+	==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==


-	So, as a general rule, if you hear someone claim that the UON is used by 'logicians' to 'justify induction', you can be fairly certain that you're dealing with someone ignorant of the very basics of what logic is...

-	~~==The Actual~~ '~~Problem~~ of ~~Induction~~'~~!==~~	+	But this in itself is not the whole story, in fact, if we stop here, ''we get the story all wrong''. You see, the ''uniformity of nature'' is in fact a necessary condition for induction but it could never be a sufficient justification of inductive inference anyway.
		+
		+	So, as a general rule, if you hear someone claim that the UON is used by 'logicians' to 'justify induction', you can be fairly certain that you're dealing with someone ignorant of the very basics of what logic is...

	So, the fact that the assumption of a uniformity of nature (UON) is of no help in justifying induction is not a concern to logicians in the first place, seeing as the ''actual problem of induction'' has ''nothing to do with the assumption of a uniformity of nature'' in the first place! The actual problem of induction is the claim that there is no valid logical ''connection'' between a collection of past experiences and what will be the case in the future. The classic ''white swans'' example serves: the fact that every swan you've seen in the past was white means simply that: every swan you've seen has been white. There is no logical "therefore" to bridge the connection "''all the swans I've seen are white''" to '' all swans are white'' or "''the next swan I encounter will be white''".		So, the fact that the assumption of a uniformity of nature (UON) is of no help in justifying induction is not a concern to logicians in the first place, seeing as the ''actual problem of induction'' has ''nothing to do with the assumption of a uniformity of nature'' in the first place! The actual problem of induction is the claim that there is no valid logical ''connection'' between a collection of past experiences and what will be the case in the future. The classic ''white swans'' example serves: the fact that every swan you've seen in the past was white means simply that: every swan you've seen has been white. There is no logical "therefore" to bridge the connection "''all the swans I've seen are white''" to '' all swans are white'' or "''the next swan I encounter will be white''".

Hannibal: /* A Non Solution to the Problem */

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 17:52:14 GMT

A Non Solution to the Problem

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	Can we assume that nature has a Uniformity?		Can we assume that nature has a Uniformity?

-	As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work. Finally, the assumption does not even address that actual problem of induction, which relates to the problems with moving from a set of observations to a general rule! So, as a general rule, if you hear someone claim that the UON is used by 'logicians' to 'justify induction, you can be fairly certain that you're dealing with ~~a Christian Presuppositionalist: i.e.~~ someone ignorant of the very basics of what logic is...	+	As Howson & Urbach point out, assuming a uniformity of nature is a nonsolution, since it's a fairly empty assumption. For how is nature uniform? And what, really, are we talking about. What would really be needed are millions upon millions of uniformity assumptions for each item under discussion. We'd need one for the melting temperature of water, of iron, of nickel, etc, etc. For example "block of ice x will melt at 0 Celsius;" for these types of assumptions actually say something. Furthermore, the uniformity of nature assumptions fall prey to meta-uniformity issues - for how are we to know that nature will always be uniform? Well, we have to assume that too. And how do we know that the uniformity of nature is uniform? Ad infinitum. So, to "solve" the philosophical problem of justifying induction by uniformity of nature solutions doesn't really work.
		+
		+	Finally, the assumption does not even address that actual problem of induction, which relates to the problems with moving from a set of observations to a general rule. Even if we accepted the UON as true, this assumption would not, in of itself, provide a framework for moving from observations to a general rule. To do this, we need a set of rules
		+
		+
		+	So, as a general rule, if you hear someone claim that the UON is used by 'logicians' to 'justify induction', you can be fairly certain that you're dealing with someone ignorant of the very basics of what logic is...

	==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==		==The Actual 'Problem of Induction'!==

Hannibal: /* Types of Inductive Logic */

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 17:48:09 GMT

Types of Inductive Logic

←Older revision		Revision as of 17:48, 14 April 2010
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	===Causal inference===		===Causal inference===
-	A causal inference draws a conclusion about a causal connection based on the conditions of the occurrence of an effect. Premises about the correlation of two things can indicate a causal relationship between them, but additional factors must be confirmed to establish the exact form of the causal relationship.	+	A causal inference draws a conclusion about a causal connection based on the conditions of the occurrence of an effect. Premises about the correlation of two things can indicate a causal relationship between them, but additional factors must be confirmed to establish the exact form of the causal relationship.
-		+
-		+
-	~~===Statistical syllogism===~~	+
-	~~A statistical [[syllogism]] proceeds from a generalization to a conclusion about an individual.~~	+
-		+
-	~~: A proportion Q of population P has attribute A.~~	+
-	~~: An individual I is a member of P.~~	+
-	~~: Therefore:~~	+
-	~~: There is a probability which corresponds to Q that I has A.~~	+
-		+
-	The proportion in the first premise would be something like "3/5ths of", "all", "few", etc. Two [[dicto simpliciter]] fallacies can occur in statistical syllogisms: "[[accident (fallacy)\|accident]]" and "[[converse accident]]".	+
-		+

	===Prediction===		===Prediction===
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	: Therefore:		: Therefore:
	: There is a probability corresponding to Q that other members of group G will have attribute A when next observed.		: There is a probability corresponding to Q that other members of group G will have attribute A when next observed.
-

	===Argument from analogy===		===Argument from analogy===

Hannibal: /* Types of Inductive Logic */

Hannibal — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 17:39:03 GMT

Types of Inductive Logic

←Older revision		Revision as of 17:39, 14 April 2010
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	==Types of Inductive Logic==		==Types of Inductive Logic==

-	Let's do a brief review of some kinds of Inductive Logic	+	Let's do a brief review of some kinds of Inductive Logic
		+
		+	===Simple induction===
		+	Simple induction proceeds from a premise about a sample group to a conclusion about another individual.
		+
		+	: Proportion Q of the known instances of population P has attribute A.
		+	: Individual I is another member of P.
		+	: Therefore:
		+	: There is a probability corresponding to Q that I has A.
		+
		+	This is a combination of a generalization and a statistical syllogism, where the conclusion of the generalization is also the first premise of the statistical syllogism.
		+
		+	===Causal inference===
		+	A causal inference draws a conclusion about a causal connection based on the conditions of the occurrence of an effect. Premises about the correlation of two things can indicate a causal relationship between them, but additional factors must be confirmed to establish the exact form of the causal relationship.
		+
		+
		+	===Statistical syllogism===
		+	A statistical [[syllogism]] proceeds from a generalization to a conclusion about an individual.
		+
		+	: A proportion Q of population P has attribute A.
		+	: An individual I is a member of P.
		+	: Therefore:
		+	: There is a probability which corresponds to Q that I has A.
		+
		+	The proportion in the first premise would be something like "3/5ths of", "all", "few", etc. Two [[dicto simpliciter]] fallacies can occur in statistical syllogisms: "[[accident (fallacy)\|accident]]" and "[[converse accident]]".
		+
		+
		+	===Prediction===
		+	A prediction draws a conclusion about a future individual from a past sample.
		+
		+	: Proportion Q of observed members of group G have had attribute A.
		+	: Therefore:
		+	: There is a probability corresponding to Q that other members of group G will have attribute A when next observed.
		+

	===Argument from analogy===		===Argument from analogy===
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	The best example of this inductive logic would be a poll. Polls rely on random samples that are representative of a group by virtue of their random selection (i.e. the fact that every person had the same chance of being chosen for the sample).		The best example of this inductive logic would be a poll. Polls rely on random samples that are representative of a group by virtue of their random selection (i.e. the fact that every person had the same chance of being chosen for the sample).

-	For those further interested in induction,see my page on the scientific method: http://www.candleinthedark.com/scientific.html In addition, at the bottom of this section, I will also discuss John Stuart Mill's Method of Causality. The rest of this page will focus on the aformentioned "problem of induction" and take a deeper look both at the problem of induction, and some solutions for this problem.	+	For those further interested in induction,see my page on the scientific method: http://www.candleinthedark.com/scientific.html In addition, at the bottom of this section, I will also discuss John Stuart Mill's Method of Causality. The rest of this page will focus on the aformentioned "problem of induction" and take a deeper look both at the problem of induction, and some solutions for this problem.

	==The Problem of Induction==		==The Problem of Induction==